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“Look, one year I had more innings at the All-Star break than Strasburg’s pitched this year. I was 16-3 and had 14 or 15 complete games.
Should I even have to point out that in the rest of Jones' career after that season, he rang up a 91 ERA+ (he had a 113 previously), and pitched his last game at age 32?
...tune him up for NLDS Game One...
If a team were really to shut down its best pitcher...
If I were the GM, I probably would figure out a different way to reduce the work load in order extend the date that the innings limit is reached.
It is not impossible for the Nationals to start Stephen back up again. We're not even in September yet. Nationals are 5.5 up with 36 games to go and Strasburg is only scheduled for a small handful of starts the rest of the way. They can shut him down now for three to four weeks and gear him back up for the playoffs. There is something like 45 days between Stephens last start and the start of the playoffs if they shut him down now before his start. That is plenty of time to give him rest and to bring him back up something the doctors think would be a pretty good move.
As for those thinking Strasburg could be given a few weeks or a month off, then return, Rizzo says don't count on that happening.
"When it happens, Stephen will not pitch again until spring training (in 2013)," he said. "We tried something similar with Zimmermann last year and he just could not get going again. We won't make the same mistake."
i do appreciate is an organization with a plan and sticking with the plan in the face of criticism. nats fans should appreciate leadership with that type of gumption
nah. it's easy to be 'flexible'. it takes real faith to stay committed
i will refrain from any social commentary but the idea of 'being agile and adapting' has in many ways undermined u.s. competitiveness in the global marketplace as well as communities.
one needs to pick one's time to change carefully versus when it's convenient.
No plan survives contact with the enemy.
What surprises me is how little intense opposition there seems to be among the fanbase, based on what our Nats followers are saying.
It also worked with the Bloods and Crips.
oh great, another civil war battle argument ensues
With so little going for it, why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all? The reason was that Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine.
It was foolish to send tanks their and even more foolish to do it while knowing you weren't going to be able to keep them properly supplied.
The American armored elements were not at their best in Lorraine either. Much of this can be attributed to the weather, but some of the blame must be given to the army commander for binding his armored divisions into infantry-heavy corps. Patton's reluctance to mass his armor came as a pleasant surprise to the Germans, who believed that their panzer divisions were just as useful in creating breakthroughs as they were in exploiting them. At a lower level, the combat command concept provided great tactical flexibility through decentralized control, but it also tempted Patton's corps commanders to break up the armored division and parcel it out by combat commands, a policy that further diluted Third Army's armored punch. Organizationally, the Armored Division of 1944 proved to be weak in infantry, a shortcoming often made good by detaching battalions from infantry divisions and assigning them to armored combat commands.
In addition, American tank crews repeatedly paid a heavy price for a doctrinal decision made before the war that declared tanks to be offensive weapons not intended for defensive combat against other tanks. As a result of this official policy, the M-4 Sherman tanks in Lorraine were badly outgunned by German panzers that mounted superb antitank pieces. The tank-stopping task was officially assigned to the tank destroyers, which were supposed to be thinly armored, highly mobile, heavily armed antitank specialists. Doctrine called for the majority of tank destroyers to be pooled in special corps and army antitank reserves, which could rush to the scene of an armored attack anywhere along the front. But Third Army didn't need an antitank reserve in Lorraine because German tanks usually appeared a few at a time. Consequently, the tank destroyer concept was discarded after the war, when the U.S. Army decided that the best weapon to stop a tank was another adequately armed tank.
Finally, the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be. In the August pursuit that brought Third Army to Lorraine, General Patton daringly violated tactical principles and conducted improvised operations with great success. He discovered, however, that the violation of logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter. Sooner or later, every improvisation and shortcut taken must be repaid. Third Army's logtstical shortcuts included burning up gasoline reserves to keep an advance going and then neglecting ammunition supply to bring up gasoline. The slowdown that affected all of the Allied forces in September and October was the inevitable price to be paid for gambling logistically that the war could be ended in August. Moreover, in spite of the logistical mobility afforded by motorization, remember that the trucks running the Red Ball Express consumed a greater and greater proportion of their cargoes as the advance progressed, forcing Third Army to turn to two time-honored methods of supply--railroad transport and local requisition.
Omar Bradley, Patton's immediate superior as commander of 12th Army Group, concurred. All Allied armies were ordered to press ahead on a broad front. In late August 1944, with the Lorraine gateway so invitingly open, it was unthinkable to Patton that Third Army should be halted in midstride.
So sticking to the plan, no tank on tank, was a bad choice, correct?
Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this, Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war could be ended in 1944. ....
Third Army was relatively dormant from 25 September to 8 November....
On 21 October, Third Army received orders to resume full-scale offensive operations on or about 10 November. Patton's objective was still the Rhine River. By this time Third Army outnumbered the Germans in Lorraine by 250,000 to 86,000. However, the Germans were about to obtain a valuable ally in the form of the weather. Seven inches of rain fell in November, about twice the normal amount. Twenty days that month had rain. Lorraine suffered from its worst floods in 35 years. On two different occasions, floodwaters washed out the Moselle bridges behind the Third Army in the midst of heavy fighting. Almost all operations were limited to the hard roads, a circumstance that the Germans exploited through the maximum use of demolitions. Third Army engineers built over 130 bridges during November.
The weather virtually negated American air superiority. The XIX Tactical Air Command, which had flown 12,000 sorties in the golden days of August, flew only 3,500 in November. There was no air activity at all for 12 days out of the month.
I'm not sure what we're debating here.
I can understand if there are Nationals' fans who don't like the plan. But I don't get why all of these other people around baseball want to express such indignation. It's really none of their business. The Nationals have made the financial investment in Strasburg, and they will be the team that has to live with the consequences.
On 29 August Gen. Eisenhower dispatched a letter to all his major commanders, outlining his intentions for the conduct of future operations. He finished saying that it was his intention "to complete the destruction of the enemy forces in the West, and then - to strike directly into the heart of the enemy homeland" (10). On 2 September Patton met with Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges and others at the 12th Army Group headquarters. Patton somewhat exaggerated when he said that he had patrols on the Moselle River near Metz and Nancy, and based at least partially on this, Eisenhower gave him permission to secure crossings over the Moselle and prepare to attack the Siegfried Line.
IIRC, if Patton's tanks and trucks had not been starved of fuel -- it was diverted to Montgomery for his disastrous scheme known as Operation Market Garden -- the Lorraine campaign would have unfolded way differently.
I think it’s absolutely absurd,” he said on the Junkies. “And I would not want to be Mike Rizzo in September when the Nationals are fighting to win that division and get to postseason and then go to postseason, and have to tell the 24 other guys on that roster, oh by the way, we’re gonna take a perfectly healthy Stephen Strasburg and shut him down.
And until that Inverted W that he throws with [on] his front side, until he corrects that and gets his front side pulling his back side through, he’s gonna have problems.
Mitch Williams...‘absolutely absurd’
So the better aphorism is "No plan survives contact with your allies"?
sent you a note
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